We study robust mechanisms to sell a common-value good. We assume that the mechanism designer knows the prior distribution of the buyers' common value but is unsure of the buyers' information structure about the common value. We use linear programming duality to derive mechanisms that guarantee a good revenue among all information structures and all equilibria. When there are two buyers and a uniform [0, 1] distribution of common value, our mechanism guarantees a revenue of at least 0.27 for any information structure and any equilibrium, which is 0.27/0.5 = 54% of the best possible revenue. When there is a single buyer, we obtain the optimal mechanism that maximizes the revenue guarantee among all information structures and all equilibria. * I thank Gabriel Carroll, Vitor Farinha Luz and Ben Golub for comments and discussions.
Introduction
In this paper we study robust mechanism design for selling a common-value good. A robust mechanism is one that works well under a variety of circumstances, in particular under weak assumptions about participants' information structure. The goal of robust mechanism design is to reduce the "base of common knowledge required to conduct useful analyses of practical problems," as envisioned by Wilson (1987) .
The literature on robust mechanism design has so far largely focused on private value settings. 1 Common value is of course important in many real-life markets (particularly financial markets) and has a long tradition in auction theory. Robustness with respect to information structure is especially relevant in a common-value setting, since it is hard in practice to pinpoint exactly what is a signal (or a set of signals) for a participant and to quantify the correlation between the signal and the common value, not to mention specifying the joint distribution of signals for all participants that correctly captures their beliefs and higher order beliefs about the common value.
We are inspired by a recent paper of Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2016) which, among other results, shows that in a first price auction of a common value good and for a fixed prior distribution of value, there is a strictly positive lower bound such that for any information/signal structure that is consistent with the prior the equilibrium revenue is always above that lower bound. For example, if there are two buyers who have quasi-linear utility and a uniform [0, 1] prior distribution for the common value, then the first price auction without a reserve price guarantees a minimum revenue of 1/6 for any information structure consistent with the prior and any equilibrium from the information structure. Clearly, the maximum revenue that any mechanism can possibly achieve in equilibrium is 1/2 which is the expected common value, so the revenue guarantee of 1/6 is already 33% of the best case scenario. This is quite an attractive prospect for a ambiguity averse seller (in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) ) who has large uncertainty about buyers' information structure and equilibrium play.
The natural followup question is whether we can achieve an even better revenue guarantee with an alternative mechanism. To answer this question we work with a max-min setup, where we first minimize the revenue over the set of information structures and equilibria for a given mechanism, and then maximize the minimized revenue over the set of mechanisms. give the powerful insight that we can combine information structure and equilibrium into a single entity called Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, which is a joint distribution over actions and value subject to obedience and consistency constraints. We note that minimizing revenue over Bayes correlated equilibria for any fixed mechanism is a linear programming problem, and we can equivalently solve the dual of that problem which is a maximization problem over the dual variables of constraints associated with Bayes correlated equilibrium. These dual variables have the interpretation as transition rates for a continuous-time Markov process over discrete states, similar to the transition probabilities in Myerson (1997) as dual variable to complete information correlated equilibrium. Moreover, we can combine the maximization over these dual variables with the maximization over the mechanism design variables, so we have a single maximization problem which is equivalent to but more tractable than the original max-min problem.
This dual approach yields new mechanisms with better revenue guarantee than the first price auction. Here we describe the simplest mechanism given by our framework: suppose there is a single good to sell, two buyers with quasi-linear utility, and a uniform [0, 1] distribution of common value for the good. Consider a binary mechanism: each buyer simultaneously says Yes or No, with the following allocations and payments:
1. If one says No, then he pays nothing and does not get the good.
2. If one says Yes and the other says No, the Yes buyer pays 3/16 and gets the good.
3. If both say Yes, then each still pays 3/16 individually and each gets the good with probability 1/2.
We claim that this mechanism guarantees a minimum revenue (over all information structures and equilibria) of 3/16, which is higher than the revenue guarantee of 1/6 from a first price auction without a reserve price and 0.177 with the optimal reserve price. We leave the proof of this claim and how we derive this mechanism to Section 3.1. Let us sketch here some examples of information structure and illustrate the performance of this mechanism. First, take the information structure in which both buyers know exactly the common value v, for every v ∈ [0, 1]. Consider the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which a buyer says Yes with probability ρ(v). For v ∈ [3/16, 3/8] each buyer is indifferent between Yes and No, so
In this mixed-strategy equilibrium, the expected revenue is
which is indeed higher than the lower bound of 3/16. Consider another information structure with two signals (high and low): conditional on v ≤ 1/4, both buyers get the low signals; conditional on 1/4 ≤ v ≤ 3/4, with probability 1/2 buyer 1 gets the high signal and buyer 2 gets the low signal (and vice versa with probability 1/2); conditional on v ≥ 3/4, both buyers get the high signals. Suppose that each buyer says Yes if he gets the high signal and says No if he gets the low signal. This is an equilibrium: conditional on a buyer receiving the low signal, his expected payoff from saying Yes is:
which is the same as his payoff from saying No. And conditional on a buyer receiving the high signal, his expected payoff from saying Yes is:
which is strictly better than saying No. Finally, it is easy to see that the expected revenue from this equilibrium is 3/16, exactly hitting the lower bound. We generalize the binary mechanism by allowing for more messages. As the number of messages increases, the revenue that the generalized mechanism guarantees (over all information structures and all equilibria) becomes better. In the limit as the number of messages tends to infinity, the mechanism guarantees a revenue of 0.27 when there are two buyers and a uniform [0, 1] distribution of common value, which is 0.27/0.5 = 54% of the best possible revenue; the mechanism also gives a good revenue guarantee for other prior distributions, as shown in Figure 1 (page 20). As the number of messages tends to infinity, the mechanism tends to the following limit: every buyer i ∈ {1, 2} simultaneously submits a number z i ∈ [0, 1], pays P i (z 1 , z 2 ), and gets the good with probability q i (z 1 , z 2 ),
where A > 0 and X < 0 are constants that are optimized for the prior distribution (the functional forms of q i and P i do not depend on the distribution). We can interpret the message z i as buyer i's demand for the good. In this mechanism the total probability that the good is sold is the higher of the two demands, max(z 1 , z 2 ), and the "loser" gets one half of his demand, while the "winner" gets the rest. The payment that a buyer makes depends only on his own demand and is an exponential function. Thus this mechanism has a flavor of an all pay auction. Moreover, we apply the same methodology to the case of one buyer and derive a mechanism that guarantees a revenue of 0.20 for the uniform [0, 1] distribution of value. In the limit as the number of messages tends to infinity, the mechanism tends to the following limit: the buyer submits a number z ∈ [0, 1] and gets the good with probability q(z) and pays P (z),
where A > 0 and X < 0 are constants that are optimized for the prior distribution. We show that this mechanism gives the optimal revenue guarantee for any prior distribution of value. Here we make a connection to Roesler and Szentes (2016) , who study the optimal information structure for a buyer when the seller is best responding to this information structure. The information structure and revenue given by Roesler and Szentes (2016) yield a subtle upper bound on the revenue that any mechanism can guarantee with one buyer, and we show that our mechanism always achieves this upper bound. 2 Our paper complements Yamashita (2016) , who studies revenue guarantee in mechanisms with private values. Yamashita (2016) identifies conditions under which a dominant-strategy mechanism gives approximately optimal revenue guarantee. Since dominant strategy is mostly inapplicable in common value settings, we must use a different technique for our revenue guarantee.
Model and Preliminary Analysis
Information Suppose the mechanism designer has a single good to sell, and there are a finite number of buyers (let I be the set of buyers, with 1 ≤ |I| < ∞). The buyers have a common value v ∈ V = {0, ν, 2ν, . . . , 1} for the good and have quasi-linear utility. Let p ∈ ∆(V ) be the prior distribution of value; the prior p is known by the designer as well as by the buyers. (The designer only knows the prior p about the value.) Without loss suppose that p(v) > 0 for every v ∈ V .
Each buyer i may possess some additional information t i ∈ T i about the common value 2 In other words, Roesler and Szentes (2016) beyond the prior, wherep ∈ ∆(V × i∈I T i ) such that marg Vp = p, 3 so his information about the common value is informed byp( · | t i ). As discussed in the introduction, the information structure (T i ,p) i∈I is not known by the designer.
Mechanism
A mechanism is a set of allocation rules q i : M → [0, 1] and payment rules P i : M → R satisfying i∈I q i (m) ≤ 1, where M i is the message space of buyer i, and M = i∈I M i the space of message profile. A mechanism defines a game in which the buyers simultaneously submit messages and have utility U i (v, m) = v · q i (m) − P i (m). We assume that a mechanism always has an opt-out option for each buyer i: there exists a message
Equilibrium
Given a mechanism (q i , P i ) i∈I and an information structure (T i ,p) i∈I , we have a game of incomplete information. A Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of the game is defined by strategy σ i : T i → ∆(M i ) for each buyer i such that for every t i ∈ T i , the support of σ i (t i ) are best responding to others' strategies:
The ex ante distribution µ ∈ ∆(V × M ) generated by any BNE (σ i ) i∈I of any information structure (T i ,p) i∈I satisfies the following two conditions:
A distribution µ ∈ ∆(V × M ) that satisfies the above two conditions is called a Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (BCE) of the mechanism (q i , P i ) i∈I . For any BCE µ, there exists an information structure and a BNE of that information structure that generates µ. See Bergemann and Morris (2016) for more details.
Designer's problem
Since the mechanism designer does not know the buyers' information structure, a natural way for him to design his mechanism is to be cautious and maximize the minimum revenue among all information structure and equilibrium.
The mechanism designer wants to solve:
such that µ is a BCE of (q i , P i ) i∈I
Minimum-Revenue BCE
As a prerequisite to solve the designer's problem, we first study the minimum revenue generated by its BCE for a given mechanism (P i , q i ) i∈I . We define
The BCE that minimizes revenue can be found by the following primal problem:
subject to:
For notational brevity, we omit the set of which a summation variable belongs when it is obvious; for example, summing over m means summing over m ∈ M .
The dual problem is:
is the dual variable for the obedience constraint of not playing m i when "recommended" to play m i in (9), and γ(v) is the dual variable for the consistency constraint
The dual problem can be succinctly written as:
where
Since
is buyer i's rate of deviation from message m i to m i , and Rev(v, m) is the revenue generated by the message profile m, corrected by the incentive to deviate from m given value v and deviation rates (α i ) i∈I . In fact, we may assume that
, and doing so makes α i a transition rate matrix (or Q-matrix), which is the analogue of the transition probability matrix for a continuoustime Markov process over discrete states (see Stroock (2013) , Chapter 5). If Condition (13) holds, we can write:
The Problem (10) is bounded, by the following lemma:
for every v ∈ V .
Proof. Fix an arbitrary v ∈ V . Consider the problem:
The dual to the above problem is:
which is minimizing the revenue over complete-information correlated equilibria µ (for the fixed v). For any µ satisfying the constraints, we have
Thus the optimal solution of (16) is bounded above by v.
Revenue Guarantee with Two Buyers
Given the previous derivations, mechanism designer's problem in (7) can be written as:
where we label the opt-out message as 0 ∈ M i . The advantage of problem (18) over the equivalent problem (7) is that we work with
Moreover, the constraints associated with α i 's amounts to minimize Rev(v, m) over m ∈ M , which is simpler than the obedience and consistency constraints associated with BCE µ. Lastly, if we find a feasible pair (α i , q i , P i ) i∈I that satisfies the constraints of problem (18), then the value of (18) under such (α i , q i , P i ) i∈I is by definition a lower bound on the optimal revenue guarantee. On the other hand, finding a feasible pair (µ, q i , P i ) i∈I for problem (7) (i.e., µ is a BCE of (q i , P i ) i∈I ) does not by itself yield any conclusion about the revenue guarantee, since there may exist another BCE µ of (q i , P i ) i∈I with a lower revenue than µ.
We also note that (18) is a bilinear programming problem: fixing the mechanism (P i , q i ) i∈I the maximization problem over (α i , γ) i∈I is linear; and fixing the dual variables (α i ) i∈I the maximization problem over (P i , q i , γ) i∈I is also linear.
In this section we restrict to the case of two buyers (I = {1, 2}) and symmetric mechanism and dual variables in the sense of Definition 1. We abbreviate (q 1 , P 1 , α 1 ) to (q, P, α). We also take ν → 0 (the set of values becomes a continuum); as ν → 0, the sum in (18) can be approximated by an integral, since Rev(v, m) is linear over v, v ∈ [0, 1], and m is from a finite set.
Two-Message Example
As an example, we first consider a mechanism with two messages: M 1 = M 2 = {0, 1} (where 0 is the opt-out message). Readers who want to go directly to our results should skip to Section 3.2.
We write the objective of Problem (18) as:
which we want to maximize subject to feasibility constraints: 0 ≤ q(1, 0) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ q(1, 1) ≤ 1/2 (recall that q(0, 1) = q(0, 0) = 0 = P (0, 0) = P (0, 1)). By symmetry we have Rev(v, (0, 1)) = Rev(v, (1, 0)).
Recall the interpretation of α as transition rates for a continuous-time Markov process on M 1 = M 2 = {0, 1} from Section 2.1, and without loss of generality suppose Condition (13) holds, i.e., α(0 | 0) = −α(1 | 0) and α(1 | 1) = −α(0 | 1). There exists (see Stroock (2013) , Section 5.4) a stationary probability distribution β ∈ ∆(M 1 ) such that
In the simple case of two messages, clearly we have
That is, a weighted average of Rev(v, m) over m is independent of v.
Consider an α such that α(1 | 0) > 0 and α(0 | 1) > 0. This implies that β(0) > 0 and β(1) > 0. Thus, by (21), if Rev(v, (0, 0)), as a function of v, has a positive slope, then Rev(v, (1, 0)) or Rev(v, (1, 1)) must have a negative slope. Since our objective is to maximize Π in (19), intuitively we should avoid negative slope in Rev(v, m), i.e., we should make α(1 | 0) = 0 or α(0 | 1) = 0.
If α(1 | 0) = 0, then clearly Rev(v, (0, 0)) = 0 so Π ≤ 0, which is a bad revenue.
Thus, suppose α(0 | 1) = 0 and α(1 | 0) = a > 0. Under these assumptions,
Similarly for the derivative with respect to q(1, 1). Thus we have
Thus to maximize Π we can set q(1, 0) = 1 and q(1, 1) = 1/2 without loss of generality.
We compute:
Rev(v, (1, 0)) = av/2 − aP (1, 1) + P (1, 0), Rev(v, (1, 1)) = 2P (1, 1).
Thus, we solve
(25) Suppose p is the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. The optimal solution to the above problem is P (1, 0) = P (1, 1) = 3/16 and a = 1, and they give the maximum Π * = 3/16. Proposition 1. Suppose there are two buyers and the prior p is the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. The symmetric mechanism of M 1 = M 2 = {0, 1} and q(0, 0) = q(0, 1) = 0, q(1, 0) = 1, q(1, 1) = 1/2,
P (0, 0) = P (0, 1) = 0, P (1, 0) = P (1, 1) = 3/16, guarantees a minimum revenue (among all BCE) of 3/16.
For the mechanism in Proposition 1, the dual variables of α(1 | 0) = 1 and α(0 | 1) = 0 satisfy the complementary slackness conditions for Problems (9) and (10) with the following primal variables µ(v, m):
The above µ(v, m) is the BCE described in the introduction (where submitting 0 is saying No, and 1 Yes), so it satisfies the constraints for Problem (9); as described in the introduction, conditional on m 1 = 0, buyer 1 is indifferent between messages 0 and 1, i.e., the complementary slackness condition for α(1 | 0) is satisfied. Since α(0 | 1) = 0, the complementary slackness condition for α(0 | 1) is trivially satisfied. For Problem (10), it is easy to check that if 0 ≤ v ≤ 1/4, (0, 0) ∈ argmin m Rev(v, m), and indeed we only have µ(v, (0, 0)) > 0 for v in that region. Likewise we have
Therefore we conclude that α solves Problem (10) and µ solves Problem (9), so µ is the BCE that minimizes revenue for this mechanism.
General Number of Messages
We can do better with more messages. In general we want to maximize:
subject to the feasibility constraints. Thus, it makes sense to make Rev(v, m) over m as redundant as possible, to minimize the number of things in min(·) inside the integral. Consider a mechanism with k + 1 messages: M 1 = M 2 = {0, 1, . . . , k}. Our usual assumption on the mechanism is: q(0, j) = 0 = P (0, j), q(j, l) ≥ 0, q(j, l) + q(l, j) ≤ 1, (j, l) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} 2 .
We focus on the mechanisms and dual variables such that:
where a is a positive constant. 4 Condition (30) attempts to make Rev(v, m) as redundant as possible. Condition (31) is for tractability and is inspired by the two-message example and by binding local obedience constraints. By the complementarity slackness condition, if α(l | j) > 0 and if α is optimal, then in the BCE dual to α a buyer must be indifferent between messages j and l if he is "recommended" to submit j.
Under Condition (31), we have: 
and −2aP (1, 0) = P (j, l) + P (l, j) − a(P (j + 1, l) − P (j, l)) − a(P (l + 1, j) − P (l, j)),
it is without loss to assume that the feasibility constraint q(j, k) + q(k, j) ≤ 1 binds for every j (if not, we can increase q(k, j) without decreasing any Rev(v, m) or violating any feasibility constraint): q(j, k) + q(k, j) = 1, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}.
Lemma 2. For every k ≥ 1, there exists {q(j, l) : 1 ≤ j ≤ k, 0 ≤ l ≤ k} that satisfies
Conditions (29), (33) and (36). For any such q we have q(1, 0) = (3k + 1)/(4k 2 ) and q(1, k) = 1/(2k). For any such P we have P (k, k) = (1 + 1/a) k − 1 2 aP (1, 0) + ((1 + 1/a) k − 1)(aP (1, k) − P (k, 0)).
Using the above two lemmas and Equation (31), we compute:
i.e., X is equal to the first line of (34), and Y is equal to the second line of (34).
We thus solve:
Proposition 2. Suppose there are two buyers. There exists a symmetric mechanism that guarantees a minimum revenue (among all BCE) of Π * defined in (40).
Proof. The proof is given by the construction above.
Suppose the prior p is the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. In the Appendix we solve (40) and get: Corollary 1. Suppose there are two buyers and the prior p is the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. There exists a symmetric mechanism that guarantees a minimum revenue (among all BCE) of Π * ≈ 0.273. This is given by k → ∞, a/k → 0.7367, X = −0.204992 and Y = 0.201343 in (40). Figure 1 (page 20) and compare with first price auction.
We compute other examples in

Implementation
We now elaborate on the allocation and payment rules for the mechanism in Proposition 2. Let k, a, X, Y be the solution of (40). As illustrated by Corollary 1, the solution typically features k tending to infinity and a/k tending to a finite number for a continuous-distribution prior.
We first take k to be large but finite. Consider the following allocation rule:
where the first and second lines above are constructed to satisfy the first and second lines of Condition (33), respectively. Because of Condition (36), we must have q(1, 0) = q(l + 1, l) − q(l, l) = (3k + 1)/(4k 2 ) by Lemma 2. In the proof to Lemma 2 we show that the above q is a legitimate allocation rule (it satisfies the feasibility constraint (29)) and satisfies Condition (36) as well.
Since q(0, l) = 0 for every l, Equation (41) is equivalent to:
For the variables j and l in q(j, l) and P (j, l), we re-parameterize them as z 1 ≡ j/k and z 2 ≡ l/k. As k → ∞, the allocation rule in (42) becomes:
We next turn to the payment rule. Among the manifold of possibilities, we choose the following simplest solution to (34):
The case of 0 ≤ l < k in (44) clearly satisfies the first line of (34) and implies that P (j, 0) = P (j, 1) = · · · = P (j, k − 1) for every j. And given P (k, 0) = P (1, 0) = · · · = P (k, k − 1), the case of l = k in (44) implies the second line of (34).
Since we have P (j + 1, l) − P (j, l) = (1 + 1/a)(P (j, l) − P (j − 1, l)) in (44), Equation (44) is equivalent to:
In Equation (45) we take (cf. (39)):
A Special Case
Unlike the allocation in (42), as k → ∞, the payment in (45) generally does not tend to a limit that is continuous in z 1 ≡ j/k and z 2 ≡ l/k at z 2 = 1. One way to fix this "defect" is setting Y such that P (1, 0) = P (1, k), i.e.,
which implies that P (j, l) is independent of l by Equation (42)). Substituting Condition (47) into Problem (40) gives the following special case of Proposition 2:
Proposition 3. Suppose there are two buyers. The symmetric mechanism of
P (j, l) = − X 2 (1 + 1/a) j − 1 , (j, l) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} 2 , guarantees a minimum revenue (among all BCE) of Π # defined in (48), where a, k and X are from solving (48).
Clearly, X < 0 in (48); moreover, the solution typically features k → ∞ and A ≡ lim k→ a/k ∈ (0, ∞) (which is true for all distributions in Figure 1 ), which gives the following limit for (49):
where z 1 ≡ j/k and z 2 ≡ l/k.
Comparison with First Price Auction
By definition, Π # of Proposition 3 is less than or equal to Π * of Proposition 2. Figure 1 shows the revenue guarantees Π * and Π # for various distributions and compares them with first price auction with reserve price and two buyers. We choose the reserve price that maximizes the revenue guarantee in first price auction (Section B.5 in Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2016) ). Distribution Beta(b, c) Beta(1, 1) is of course the uniform distribution.
We see that in these examples Π * and Π # are quite close, both achieve a good fraction of the mean value, which is the best possible revenue, and both are better than the optimal revenue guarantee from first price auction with reserve price. In Figure 1 we also include the revenue guarantees from the mechanism in Proposition 4 with one buyer, which is discussed in the next section; here the mechanism takes message only from buyer 1 and ignores buyer 2, who gets nothing and pays nothing.
Revenue Guarantee with a Single Buyer
In this section we consider the case of one buyer I = {1}. In this case the buyer does not necessarily know his own value, and each BCE corresponds to an information structure about value and the associated equilibrium play. In the case of one buyer we know sharp upper bound on the BCE revenue that the designer can guarantee. For example, if the prior is the uniform distribution on [0, 1], the designer can guarantee (among all BCE) a revenue of at most 1/4: fix any mechanism, there is a BCE corresponding to the buyer knowing his value (i.e., the classical private-value information structure), and its revenue must be less than 1/4 which is obtained by the private-value optimal mechanism (a posted price of 1/2). 5 In fact, a result of Roesler and Szentes (2016) gives a tighter and more subtle upper bound: the designer can guarantee (among all BCE) a revenue of at most 0.2036 for uniform [0, 1] distribution. We will show that for the case of one buyer the analogues of Assumptions (30) and (31) give a mechanism that guarantees exactly the Roesler-Szentes upper bound.
As before we abbreviate (q 1 , P 1 , α 1 ) to (q, P, α). Consider k+1 messages: M 1 = {0, 1, . . . , k}.
Figure 1: Revenue guarantees from Proposition 2 (Π * ), Proposition 3 (Π # ), first price auction with optimal reserve price (Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris, 2016) , and one buyer mechanism in Proposition 4 (one buyer Π * ). Our usual assumption on the mechanism is q(0) = P (0) = 0, 0 ≤ q(j) ≤ 1, j = 0, 1, . . . , k.
Using our previous methodology (making Rev(v, m) as redundant as possible), we focus on (q, P, α) such that:
for a constant a > 0.
Under Condition (53), we have
therefore, Condition (52) holds if and only if for every j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1},
−aP (1) = P (j) − a(P (j + 1) − P (j)) ≡ X
It is without loss of generality to assume q(k) = 1, since we can increase q(k) which increases Rev(v, k − 1) without decreasing any other Rev(v, j). Moreover, Equation (56) is equivalent to:
Thus we are led to the following mechanism:
Thus we maximize:
Proposition 4. Suppose there is one buyer. The mechanism in (58) guarantees a minimum revenue (among all BCE) of Π * defined in (59), where a, k and X are from solving (59).
Proposition 5. Suppose there is one buyer and the prior p admits a density on [0, 1]. If
then as k → ∞ and a/k → A, the mechanism in (58) guarantees a minimum revenue (among all BCE) of −X/A. Moreover, there exist A ≥ 0 and X ≤ 0 that satisfy (60) such that −X/A is the optimal BCE revenue that the designer can guarantee, i.e., it is a solution to Problem (18).
As k → ∞ and a/k → A, the mechanism in (58) becomes:
where we re-parameterize z ≡ j/k in q(j) and P (j).
As an example, when the prior p is the uniform [0, 1] distribution, A = 0.795905 and X = −0.162072 satisfy (60), which gives a revenue guarantee (among all BCE) of Π * = 0.203632. See Figure 1 (page 20) for other examples.
The first part of Proposition 5 comes from solving (59) and taking the first order condition. The second part is due to Roesler and Szentes (2016) . Roesler and Szentes (2016) study the optimal information structure for the buyer given the seller is best responding to this information structure. Such information structure has the following cumulative distribution function of signals:
where s ∈ [0, 1] is an unbiased signal of the buyer for his value (E[v | s] = s), 0 < π ≤ B are two free parameters, and there is an atom of size π/B at s = B. If the buyer has this distribution of unbiased signals (and observes the realization of the signal), then the seller is clearly indifferent between every posted price in [π, B] and has an optimal revenue of π. i.e., G B π has the same mean as p and second-order stochastically dominates p. Roesler and Szentes (2016) prove that the best information structure for the buyer is G B * π * , where π * is the smallest π such that Condition (63) holds for some B (such B must be unique; let B * be the one corresponding to π * ). For example, if the prior p is the uniform [0, 1] distribution, then π * = 0.203632 and B * = 0.872814. We note that if the buyer has information structure G B * π * , then in any mechanism and any BCE of that mechanism the seller's revenue is at most π * , since the best mechanism for the seller given a fixed information structure is a posted price mechanism, and any posted price in [π * , B * ] generates a revenue of π * by construction. (The order of quantifiers is important though: if the seller commits to a posted price mechanism, then his revenue guarantee is strictly less than π * . 6 ) Thus whatever mechanism the seller uses, his revenue guarantee is bounded above by π * .
Given (π * , B * ) for a prior distribution p, simple algebra in the appendix shows there exist A ≥ 0 and X ≤ 0 that satisfy (60) with π * = −X/A. This proves the second part of Proposition 5: the mechanism in (58) obtains the Roesler-Szentes upper bound.
Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. We first prove the second part of the lemma. By (36) we have q(k, k) = 1/2. By the second line of (33) this implies that q(j, k) = j/(2k) and q(k, j) = 1 − j/(2k), j = 0, 1, . . . , k. Then we have
where the last equality follows from the first line of (34). Thus, q(1, 0) = (3k + 1)/(4k 2 ). For the first part, we claim that q defined by Equation (41) satisfies Conditions (33), (29) and (36).
Condition (33) is obvious. We clearly have q(j, k) = j/(2k) for every j = 0, 1, . . . , k from the second line of (41). The third line of (41) implies that q(k, 0) = [(3k + 1) + (k − 1)(4k + 1)]/(4k 2 ) = 1 and that q(k, l) − q(k, l + 1) = (4k − 2k)/(4k 2 ) = 1/(2k), l = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1. This proves Condition (36).
Finally, for Condition (29), we need to show that q(j, l) + q(l, j) ≤ 1. The case of j = k is shown in the previous paragraph, and when j = l ≤ k − 1 this follows from the fact that q(j, j) = j(2k + 1)/(4k 2 ) < 1/2 from the third line of (41). So suppose l < j ≤ k − 1. We have q(j, l) − q(j, l − 1) = −2k/(4k 2 ) and q(l, j) − q(l − 1, j) = (2k + 1)/(4k 2 ) by the third line of (41). This implies that q(j, l) + q(l, j) > q(j, l − 1) + q(l − 1, j) for every l < j. Thus, it suffices to show that q(j − 1, j) + q(j, j − 1) ≤ 1 for every j = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1. Since q(j − 1, j) = q(j, j) − (2k + 1)/(4k 2 ) and q(j, j − 1) = q(j, j) − (2k + 1)/(4k 2 ) + (3k + 1)/(4k 2 ), we have q(j − 1, j) + q(j, j − 1) < 2q(j, j) < 1.
Proof of Lemma 3. We first prove the existence part of the lemma. There exists
that satisfies the first line of (34), for any given values of
For the second line of (34), we can rewrite it as Rev(v, (j − 1, k)) = Rev(v, (j, k)), i.e., P (j + 1, k) − P (j, k) = (1 + 1/a)(P (j, k) − P (j − 1, k)) + (P (k, j) − P (k, j − 1))/a, (65) for j = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1. Equation (65) implies that P (j + 1, k) − P (j, k) = (1 + 1/a) j P (1, k) + j j =1
(1 + 1/a) j−j (P (k, j ) − P (k, j − 1))/a, (66) and as a consequence, for any j = 0, 1, . . . , k: 67) Clearly, the above equation can be satisfied for any given values of P (1, k) and P (k, j), j = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1. This proves the first part of the lemma.
Now fix an arbitrary P that satisfies Condition (34). We claim that
(1 + 1/a) l−j (P (l, j) − P (l, j − 1)) = P (l, l − 1) + a((1 + 1/a) l − 1) 2 P (1, 0) − (1 + 1/a) l P (l, 0),
for every l = 1, 2, . . . , k. Equation (68) for l = k and Equation (67) together imply Equation (37), which proves the second part of the lemma. Clearly, (68) is true for l = 1. Suppose (68) is true for l = κ < k as an induction hypothesis; we prove that this implies (68) is true for l = κ + 1.
From Rev(v, (κ, j − 1)) = Rev(v, (κ, j)) we have:
= (1 + 1/a)(P (κ, j) − P (κ, j − 1)) + (1 + 1/a)(P (j, κ) − P (j − 1, κ)) − (P (j + 1, κ) − P (j, κ)), summing the above equation across j = 1, 2, . . . , κ − 1 gives:
(1 + 1/a) κ+1−j (P (κ + 1, j) − P (κ + 1, j − 1)) (70) 1, κ) ).
That is, where in the last equality we have used the induction hypothesis (68) for l = κ. From Rev(v, (κ, 0)) = Rev(v, (1, 0)) we have (1 + 1/a)P (κ, 0) − P (1, κ) = P (κ + 1, 0) − 2P (1, 0). Therefore, the previous equation is equivalent to:
From Rev(v, (κ, κ)) = Rev(v, (1, 0)) we have (1 + 1/a)P (κ, κ) − P (κ + 1, κ) = −P (1, 0).
Therefore, the previous equation is equivalent to:
= (1 + 1/a) 2 P (κ, κ − 1) + [a(1 + 1/a) 2 ((1 + 1/a) κ − 1) 2 + 2(1 + 1/a) κ+1 + (1 + 1/a)]P (1, 0) (1, 0) ) we have (1 + 1/a)P (κ, κ − 1) 2P (1, 0) , Therefore, the previous equation is equivalent to:
= [a(1 + 1/a) 2 ((1 + 1/a) κ − 1) 2 + 2(1 + 1/a) κ+1 − (1 + 1/a)]P (1, 0)
− (1 + 1/a) κ+1 P (κ + 1, 0) + (1 + 1/a)P (κ, κ).
Finally, using (1 + 1/a)P (κ, κ) − P (κ + 1, κ) = −P (1, 0) again we get:
= [a(1 + 1/a) 2 ((1 + 1/a) κ − 1) 2 + 2(1 + 1/a) κ+1 − (1 + 1/a) − 1]P (1, 0)
− (1 + 1/a) κ+1 P (κ + 1, 0) + P (κ + 1, κ).
Since a(1 + 1/a) 2 ((1 + 1/a) κ − 1) 2 + 2(1 + 1/a) κ+1 − (1 + 1/a) − 1 = a((1 + 1/a) κ+1 − 1) 2 , this proves (68) when l = κ + 1.
Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose p is the uniform [0, 1] distribution. We want to maximize: Π = min 3k + 1 2k 2 av + X, av 2k + Y, − (1 + 1/a) k − 1 2 X − 2((1 + 1/a) k − 1)Y dv.
(76) Fixing a and k, it is easy to see that ∂Π ∂X = ∂Π ∂Y = 0 have a unique solution in (X, Y ); substituting such (X, Y ) into (76) gives: Π * (a, k) = a((1 + 1/a) k − 1) 2 1 + 3k − 2(1 + 1/a) k (1 + k) + (1 + 1/a) 2k (1 + 3k) 4k 2 (1 + 1/a) 4k .
We numerically verify that max a Π * (a, k) is strictly increasing in k. Let us take k → ∞ and choose a sequence of {a(k)} such that A ≡ lim k→∞ a(k)/k is a well-defined limit (potentially infinity). Applying Taylor's theorem, we have lim k→∞ k log(1 + 1/a(k)) = k/a(k) = 1/A, thus lim k→∞ Π * (a(k), k) = A(exp(1/A) − 1) 2 (3 − 2 exp(1/A) + 3 exp(2/A)) 4 exp(4/A)
The above function is maximized at A = 0.7367, yielding Π * = 0.272651. Finally, we substitute A = 0.7367 back to (X, Y ) that solves ∂Π ∂X = ∂Π ∂Y = 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. As k → ∞ and a/k → A, Π in (59) has the following limit: We maximize Π over A and X. Suppose − X exp(1/A) A ∈ [0, 1], the first order condition is:
which is easily shown as equivalent to (60). Moreover, we have the limit Π = −X/A in (79) under Condition (80). We now relate Roesler and Szentes (2016) to Equation (80), which simultaneously proves the existence of X and A that satisfy (80) as well as their optimality in solving (18); see the discussion about Roesler and Szentes (2016) 
i.e., log(B) = µ − π + π log π π .
(82)
Clearly, B ≥ π if and only if π ≤ µ.
The requirement that G B π second-order stochastic dominates p is equivalent to: s π (1 − π/s ) ds = s − π − π log s + π log π ≤ s 0 p(v ≤ s ) ds ,
for every s ∈ [π, B]. Define F (s, π) ≡ s 0 p(v ≤ s ) ds − (s − π − π log s + π log π).
Let π * be the minimum π such that min s∈[π,B] F (s, π) ≥ 0, and let B * be the corresponding B from (82). Let s * be an arbitrary selection from argmin s∈[π * ,B * ] F (s, π * ).
For π ≤ µ, B (defined by (82)) decreases as π increases. Moreover, ∂F ∂π (s, π) > 0 for every s > π. Thus, min s∈[π,B] F (s, π) is a continuously increasing function of π. So we must have F (s * , π * ) = 0.
If B * < 1, we must have F (B * , π * ) > 0, for otherwise we would have 1 0 G B * π * (s) ds > 1 0 p(v ≤ s) ds, which would contradict the fact that G B * π * has the same mean as p. If B * = 1, then we have ∂F ∂s (B * , π * ) = π * B * > 0. In any case B * = s * . Since F (π * , π * ) > 0, we also have π * = s * . Thus we must have ∂F ∂s (s * , π * ) = 0. Therefore, we have (the first line is ∂F ∂s (s * , π * ) = 0, and the second line is F (s * , π * ) = 0): p(v ≤ s * ) − 1 + π * /s * = 0,
s * 0 p(v ≤ s) ds − (s * − π * − π * log s * + π * log π * ) = − s * 0 v p(dv) + π * log s * − π * log π * = 0, where in the second equality of the second line we use integration by parts and substitute in the first line. Clearly, the above equations are (60) with s * = −X exp(1/A)/A and π * = −X/A.
